Introduction
Forest 1 ands provide numerous things adding to the social, cultural, and economic aspects of life for many people including fuel, water, forage, stabilization of shifting sands, protection of catchment areas, soil erosion and flood control, watershed, habitat for wildlife, and sites for outdoor recreation. Because of their large area and wide geographic dis~ersion, they are also important in maintaining the natural environment. They are the source of timber, an important industry in many parts of the world. Products made from trees affect everyone, incl uding those who may never have the opportunity to enjoy the natural beauty of a forest or to participate in forest-based recreation.
The continued economic viability of forests has generated concern for several reasons. Forecasts of rapid depl-etion, mul tipl e-use confl icts, and increasing environmental restrictions have made modern forest management a controversial public policy issue in many parts of the worl d. Indi a is no excepti on. 1
The total area of lands classified as forests in India is about 24 percent of the geographi ca 1 area. Forests and forest products prov i de jobs for only 0.2 percent of the working population but account for 1.5 percent of the national income. This contribution has been rising at the annua 1 rate of near 1 y 15 percent per year compared to a 3 percent rate of growth for total national income (Kul karni, 1970) . Again, the addition of non-timber benefits of forests would increase the contribution of forests and forest products.
With over a hundred ~earsl history of forestry practice, India nevertheless stands classified on the world map of forest resources as belonging to a "deficit" zone. The nearly 1/7th of the world's population that lives in this country has hardly 1/55th of the world's forest area to depend upon. Available forests in India are not yet fully productive. With the rapid pace of industrialization and the rising standard of living, the requirements of forests and forest products in this country are steadi ly mounting. Furthermore, the sort of rural economy that exists in India is so intricately tied into local forestry that attempts to segregate the two create serious problems, both social and economic (Kul karni, 1970) . Thus, the presence of and issues involved in a multidimensional natural resource like forestry in the soci o-economi-c sphere of rndi a can hard 1 y be ignored. Thi s paper addresses one such issue.
Forest management involves the simultaneous management of multipleuse resources because, timber is only one of many outputs produced from a forest land and represents one of the earl iest cases of formal application of economic principles to resource management.
One of the major policy questions which has dominated forest resource economi cs 1 i terature is: When shoul d timber be harvested? In an economic context, any time sequence for harvesting constitutes a rotation pol icy; a sequence that maximizes the discounted total net benefits is an optimal rotation pol icy.
Theoretical Setting
Determining the optimal rotation period may be regarded as an expression of a basic economic problem. Fundamentally, it is a ' problem in capita 1 theory and asset repl acement. Growing forest stock represents the accumulation of forest capital. During the transition from seedl ings to maturity, trees serve as both inventory and capital.
Thus, the quest i on of how much capi ta 1 to invest for how long is critical for timber production economics (Gregory, 1972; Perrin, 1972; and Hyde, 1980) . This, in turn, necessari ly invol ves other basic economic issues. What, if anything, does a firm (e.g., in the U.S.) or a publ i.e forest 1 and manager (e.g., in India) attempt to maximize over time? What is the logical financial objective in managing a forest?
Over time, several different objectives have been proposed for determining optimality. These are discussed in Gaffney (1960), Bentley and Teeguarden (1965) , Gregory (1972), and Samuel son (1976) . Their arguments show an overall preference for the maximum net present value (NPV) rule. Samuelson (1976) argues that correct capital theoretic analysis requires that the primary objective should be to maximize the NPV of revenues obtainable from all the infinite sequence of harvests which can be obtained from the forest land. This view, known in the forestry 1 i terature as the "soi 1 expectati on va 1 ue" (SE) approach, was advo.eated originally by Faustmann (1849).
The Faustmann mode 1 has played a key ro 1 e in forest economi cs. It has become the keystone of the currently held view regarding timber rotation under a criterion of financial maturity (Samuel son, 1976 ).
Faustmann introduced the simple and deterministic competitive economic model, with the objective of maximizing the present val ue V(t) of perpetual returns to the fixed fact.or of production, an acre of timber land. The total value, V(t), is the sum of revenues minus costs.
Reven{Je is the expected price, p, times the volume harvested, Q(tl)' discounted from the time of harves, t 1 , to the initial moment of land availability, by the opportunity cost of capital, r.
Since, in this model, trees grow naturally without sil viclul tural inputs, harvest vo 1 ume conti nues to be a functi on on 1 y of time and there are no costs other than opportunity costs of capital (r) and 1 and (R). The cost of land is the economic rent, R, discounted over the duration of the timber production period. If timber production constitutes the best use of the 1 and, then substituting a perpetual timber production term for the rent term should allow the problem to be stated as:
(1 )
Because all the parameters continue unchanged from one production peri od to the next, an i dent i ca 1 prob 1 em confronts the forest manager fol lowing each harvest. Therefore, each succeeding production period is of the same length (ti = tj Vi, j) and equation (1) is usually simplified as V{t) = max p.Q(t)e-rt (l-e -rt ) -1.
This form is fami 1 iar to the foresters as the Faustmann equation and rV (t) represents the "soi 1 expectat i on va 1 ue" (SE). Samue 1 son (1976) proved that the single rotation model with land rental payments and the perpetua 1 timber product i on mode 1 possess ident iea 1 opt ima 1 i ty conditions.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for a maximum derived from equation (2) are
where the subscripts indicate derivative of the function with respect to the subscript. Timber is "financially mature" when its natural growth rate is r(1-e-rt )-1, which is equal to the opportunity cost of capital adjusted upward to compensate for the impl icit land rent. The greater the cost of capital, the shorter the production or rotation period.
It can be shown that the optimal economic production period is shorter than the opt ima 1 -hi 0 1 ogi ca 1 product i on peri od when the cost of capital r is positive. For smaller costs of capital, the valuemaximizing harvest age if1creases unti 1 it converges with the vol umemaximizing age (Hyde, 1980) .
Modified Faustmann models within static deterministic framework
Within the static Faustmann framework, several articles have recently appeared indicating alternative solutions under different and sometimes less restrictive assumptions (Clark, 1976; Walter, 1980; Hyde, 1980; Nautiyal and fowl er, 1980; Heaps, 1981; McConnell et al., 1983; Chaflg, 1981 and Nautiyal, 1983; Hardie et al, 1984) .
Individually, each provides valuable ingredients toward generalization.
Each extends and IOOdifies the basic Faustmann formulation.
However, the opt imum r· otat i on prob 1 em viewed by these authors is an optimum timber management problem abstracting from the important multiple-use characteristics of forest land. Samuelson (1976) took note of the problem and Hartman (1976) and Strang (1983) developed a generalized Faustmann model by inc.orporating benefits associated with the forest resource besides timbering. The stock of standing forest resource prov i des other benefi ts to soc i ety, such as water, h i' l< i ng, flood control, and wildl ife. The flow of these services is an increasing function of the age of the forest. In order to simplify the model somewhat, these may collectively be viewed as "recreation" benefits (Hartman, 1976) . This formal recognition of recreational services leads to a longer opt i ma 1 rotat ion.
On examining the model of Hartman and Strang, and with their help, we obtain some new results:
1. A finite optimal harvesting date may not exist. In this case the forest is intended to provide only recreational services.
2. If there is a finite optimal rotation, it may imply harvesting after the forest has reached its maximum growth and has started to decline.
3. If by mistake we have delayed harvesting past the optimal date, then the correct decision may switch to leaving the forest in tact. This is in contrast to the usual result of clear-cutting as soon as the mistake is realized.
Dynamic treatment
The literature discussed to this point strongly depends on long-run predictions of future prices, costs, and discount rates. These elements are observed during a single moment in time. However, they change over time and can be properly captured only within a dynamic framework.
Anderson (1976) , Cl ark (1976), Heaps and Neher (1979) , and Berck (1981) have extended previous analyses by providing a dynamic treatment of forest harvesting. The authors have uti 1 ized optimal control theory (the maximum pri nci p 1 e). Some interest i ng suggest ions for copi ng wi th the optimum rotation question have evol ved from these studies.
Anderson1s steady-state control solution, in particular, is identical wi th the Faustmann rotat i on mode 1, 1 endi ng support to the 1 atter as appropri ate not on 1 y for pri vate timber management dec is ions but a 1 so for public policy where the goal of the planner is the maximization of discounted net soc i a 1 we 1 fa re from timber prod uct ion 0 v er an i nfi n i te planning horizon.
Treatment of uncertainty
All the analyses mentioned so far assume a deterministic world. In reality, of course, current and future prices of timber are uncertain as are the effects of environmental changes on resource stocks and the amount of the resource available for extraction. Norstrom (1975) using a Markov model for price fluctuations demonstrated that for a single production process with either uncertain output vol urnes or uncertain output prices, longer rotations and 1 arger harvests are optimal. Recently, the optimal rotation period when the risk of unpredictable destruction (e.g. by fire, insects, flood, and storm) is present has been considered by Martell (1980 ), Routledge (1980 , and Reed (1984) . Martell Hartman (1976) , Strang (1983) , and Berck (1981) addressed this situation by introducing the consumptive value of standing forest in their models.
Yet in doing so, they have ignored the costs involved in providing and making these consumptive values accessible to potential users.
One way to partially bridge this gap is to incorporate into the model the costs associated with regeneration of the tree population and associated maintenance, and the costs associated with providing recreational services. This is absol utely necessary if the required management decision is based on net values (Hyde, 1980) . While is strictly concave with respect to time (Fig. 2) . The forest stand is regenerated in an initially barren land at time t=O at a fixed regeneration and maintenance cost, c~. The stumpage va 1 ue (net of harvesting costs) of the tree stock in a competitive market at time t = T, G T , is a function of the age of the forest, such that GT = G(T). Due to its underlying biological characteristics B'{T) ~ 0, (Figure 1 ). It is plausible to assume that both R(t) and G(t) are bounded and continuous.
Given that the forest operator plans for an infinite horizon and an Let us consider a synchronized forest of even-aged stands. It is hypothesized that the stock of the standing forest resource provides benefits to society but the private resource owner may ignore this flow of services rel ated to the stock of the resource. The model outl ined below is, thus, a normative model that will permit us to derive rules characterizing optimum behavior from a social viewpoint. It is then examined to what extent a competitive decision characterized by a Faustmann-type decision rule is likely to behave in this way.
I n the present mode 1, the forest resource is contro 11 ed by a hypothetical social manager/planner whose primary function is to manage the natural resource commodity, timber. It is assumed that the manager -chooses the rate of harvest in each period to maximize the social utility of the discounted stream of net benefits from the resource over an infinite planning horizon.
The fol lowing assumptions and relations are maintained in the development of the model:
Let X = X(t), a scalar, be the stock of the harvestable population of trees in a forest at time t. Let its growth be described by the differential equation Let c = c[h(t), X(t)], where c is the (total) cost of harvesting.
Cost is assumed to be negatively rel ated to stock (ac/ax < 0). It is also assumed that ac/ah ~ O. The costs directly associated with the harvest rate h(t) are composed of the opportunity costs of inputs and the loss of recreational services that will be assumed to be related to the remaining undisturbed stock of the standing forest. The costs indirectly associated with h(t) are those imposed on the future as a result of using some of the timber stock.
The social benefits (58) 
. ; .
subject to x = g[X(t)] h(t) X ~ 0; h [0, h max ] 12 (7 ) In (6) W is the di scounted "soci a 1" va 1 ue of the perpetua 1 stream of net benefits over time and is assumed to be convex from above.
Equat ions {6) and (7) compri se a prob 1 em inapt ima 1 cant ro 1 theory, with the control variable being h(t) and the state variable being X(t).
The equation of motion specifying the rate of change of X(t) is (7).
It can be demonstrated that an optimal control model is consistent with the Faustmann framework for maximizing the NPV of a series of rotat ion cyc 1 es of i dent i ca 1 1 ength e v en when the val ue of ree reat i ana 1 services and the reg~neration costs are added to the model. Forest managers utilize the Faustmann framework to maximize the discounted net return of forested land when the forest provides timber value, if harvested, and a flow of value of recreational services, if standing, provided they take account of the flow of positive externality flowing fro m the s t 0 c k 0 fbi a mas s . I n t he pro c e s s, the man age r s fa 1 low a n infinite chain of harvests, the steady-state characteristics of which ar~ equivalent to the steady-state rule that would be adopted by a manager/pl anner maximizing social wel fare in the context of equations (6) and (7).
(() Uncertainty and risk: As noted earl ier, traditionally, the problem of determining optimal forest rotation has been treated within the framework of deterministic model s. The more general ized deterministic model (incorporating both the benefits and costs of the recreational services and repl anting costs) presented above can be further extended by incorporating at 1 east two aspects of stochashic environment separately: (1) An uncertain stumpage price when forest owner is risk averse;
(2) Risk of unpredictabl e catastrophe making stock of resource biomass (tree population) uncertain.
As for situation (1), uncertainty" in stumpage price results in a V that is stochastic. Hence, the manager must select the best of the avai 1 abl e probabi 1 ity distributions for V, which are call eo random prospects. If we assume that the manager's behavior in sol ving this problem conforms to the Von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms, then it can be inferred that the preference ordering for various random prospects can be represented by a utility function U[V(t)] and that the best prospect is found by maximizing the expected value of utility.3
For a forest manager with a pl anni ng hori zon runni ng through an infinite sequence of identical harvest cycles the objective function to be maximized turns out to be where r > 0 is the ri sk 1 ess interest rate. The forest manager's att i tude towa rds ri sk in resource return is represented by the form of the U[V(T)]. Strict concavity in the uti 1 ity function impl ies risk aversion. The choice of the particular form is based on its risk characteristics in terms of the measures of risk aversion developed by Arrow (1971) and Pratt (1964) . In the analysis here, utility is represented by a concave, continuous, and twice differentiable function of discounted net returns, U[V(T)], where (9) so that the forest manager is assumed to be risk averse.
The expected util ity of discounted net returns from an infinite chain of cycles can be written as
where the first integration is over the range of G(T).
(10 ) Sol ution of (10) shows that the optima 1 rotation period wi 11 be longer than that under conditions of certainty. It can al so be shown that the peri od wi 11 be 1 engthened wi th i ncreas i ng ri sk and shortened with increasing expected stumpage price under nonincreasing absolute risk aversion of the forest manager.
Situation (2) considers the possibi1 ity of unpredictable destruction of a forest stand by natural causes (e.g., forest fire, s t 0 rm , flood, dis e a s e , and ins e c t p 1 a g u e s ) and its imp act 0 nth e rotation decisions. It is assumed that natural catastrophes occur in an age-independent homogeneous Poisson process. 4 Two cases are considered: when catastrophes result in total destruction of the forest stand, and when destruction through loss agent is only partial. It is assumed that the objective of the forest operator is to maximize discounted expected return from the forest.
In effect it is assumed that the forest operator is risk neutral.
It can be shown that risk of catastrophic destruction of biomass whether tota 1 or part i a 1 wi 1 1 1 ead to a rotat i on peri od dependent on the value of the average rate of occurrence of catastrophes (A). However, the conclusion that the rotation ~eriod will be shorter than that suggested by the simple Faustmann rule, is shown to hold unambiguously.
As A 0, the rotation period tends to coincide with the generalized Faustmann rotation period. With higher values of A the rotation length tends to be shorter. A > 0 shortens the rotation 1 ength in two ways:
one through its impact as a risk-permium and the other through its impact on both the stumpage value and on the net value of recreational services.
Scope for Further Research
The theoretical generality obtained thus far need to be empirically tested, not only to verify the theoretical results but al so to extend the theories leading to more definitive conclusions.
The optimal control formulation discussed here regards recreational benefits as a positive stock external ity assumed to be ignored by a private forest manager. But the current trend towards creating and providing recreational faci 1 ities by private forest operators (e.g.) in the U.S.) needs to be captured in such a dynamic model where production of recreational services is an activity having both benefits and costs assoc i ated wi th it.
The whole problem of uncertainty needs to be treated in a more gene r a 1 and) pre f e, a b 1 y, d y n ami c f ram e w 0 r kin cor po rat i n gal 1 m a j 0 r sources of uncertainty.
Even within a partial-equilibrium framework impact of uncertainty related to demand for recreational services and prices of inputs and the impact of risk of age dependent natural catastrophes in presence of net recreational values need further investigation. The latter, furthermore, needs to incorporate the more plausible assumption Df risk aversion as a behavior towards risk.
The economi cs of opt imum forest rotat i on in the context of multiple-use .characteristics of forests needs deeper probe. If timber production for commercial use is the primary objective of management of a forest, non-timber benefits may be treated as stock-externalities. On the other hand, sometime in some locations the primary objective of public forest management may be to provide non-timber benefits per se to the society. In either case, whi 1 e benefits 1 ike recreation (as the term connotes) can be provided as private goods (as in the U.S.), many other multiple benefits epitomized by ecological and environmental impacts of forestry, essentially assume the nature of publ ic goods.
They generally, can not be withheld from one individual without withholding from all and thus, must be supplied communally. In the context of countries 1 ike India, this publ ic goods characteristic of non-timber benefits (including recreation) is definitely very significant. Optimal provision of these publ ic goods may, thus, necessitate the intervention of the government. In fact, in India, as much as 92.3 percent of the total forest area is owned by the government. Determining the optimum forest rotation in the context of optimal provision of public goods flowing from forests, provides ample area of further investigation--theoretical as well as empirical.
FOOTNOTES
1 See, e.g., the ed i tori a 1 comments in The Statesman Week 1 y, "As the population grows and, with it, the number of cattle, the temptation to cut down forests becomes irresistible. The demand for more land for cultivation and grazing, as well as for more wood for fuel, house construction, furniture and industry can mean wanton damage: ••• " (1985) 2For the details of the formulations, derivations and analyses of the fol lowing discussions see Bhattacharyya (1985) 3See Sandmo (1971) 4See Ross (1983) 
